IF there is a record for the most divorces involving a political party in Malaysia, the title would go to PAS, the Islamist party.
It has been involved in at least seven major coalition arrangements.
All of these alliances or political fronts have ended disastrously. There is always one recurring theme that stands out throughout its history: PAS has found it extraordinarily difficult to remain in long-term electoral coalitions.
In simple terms, PAS can never stay in a political relationship and there are many reasons for that, even if it refuses to admit them.
The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) is one of Malaysia’s oldest and most resilient political parties.
Founded in 1951, it has survived electoral defeats, ideological disputes, leadership crises, and dramatic changes in Malaysian politics.
Despite painting itself as a religious party with supposedly strong moral principles, the party has always been ready to cut deals for power and positions.
Yet it has always been able to justify all its actions to its faithful followers, always on religious grounds.
Over the decades, PAS has cooperated with the Alliance Party before independence, it joined Barisan Nasional in the 1970s, the Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah coalition, Barisan Alternatif, Pakatan Rakyat, Gagasan Sejahtera, and the current Perikatan Nasional coalition.
While in Barisan Alternatif, the party leaders provided “sufficient and convincing” grounds on why it was acceptable for PAS to work with DAP.
Of course, now the party sings a completely different tune and has blamed the DAP for every flaw under the Malaysian sun.
The question is not why individual coalitions failed, but why PAS repeatedly encounters difficulties in sustaining coalition politics itself.
Unlike many political parties that primarily organise around economic interests, regional concerns, or broad electoral coalitions, PAS is fundamentally an ideological party.
Its core mission has long been the promotion of Islamic governance and the expansion of Islam’s role in public life.
The party has not hidden the fact that its aim is to set up an Islamic state and do away with any form of secular and Westminster-style legislature.
It will impose gender segregation and close down entertainment outlets, including cinemas.
This ideological commitment provides PAS with a loyal and disciplined support base. It doesn’t care how non-Muslims feel.
However, such a hardline stance also limits the party’s flexibility when negotiating with coalition partners.
As in all marriages, coalitions require compromise. Partners must often soften policies, postpone contentious goals, or accept positions that do not fully satisfy their supporters.
For PAS, however, issues involving Islamic law, religious authority, and the role of Islam in government are often viewed as matters of principle rather than negotiable policy preferences.
As a result, coalition partners frequently fear that PAS’s long-term objectives may conflict with the broader, more pluralistic agendas necessary to win support in Malaysia’s multi-ethnic society.
Malaysia’s political system creates a unique challenge for PAS. The party’s strongest support traditionally comes from conservative Malay-Muslim voters, particularly in the east coast states. It doesn’t help that PAS has not governed its four states well – Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu remain the poorest states.
If it cannot run these states competently, why would Malaysians, especially urban Malays and non-Muslims, want to gamble their future away with PAS?
National electoral success requires cooperation with parties representing non-Muslim communities, urban voters, and more secular constituencies.
This produces a recurring contradiction. PAS needs coalition partners to gain national influence, but its partners often want PAS to moderate its Islamic agenda in order to appeal to non-Muslim voters.
PAS leaders often reassert their religious agenda, which has coalition partners such as Gerakan and MIPP fearing electoral backlash among non-Muslim voters. The balance is difficult to sustain over time.
Its participation in Barisan Nasional during the 1970s ended amid disputes over state-federal relations and power-sharing arrangements.
The partnership demonstrated that even cooperation with fellow Malay-based parties could break down when questions of political authority emerged.
The latest breakdown has been with Bersatu headed by Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, and the situation has ended in yet another divorce.
During the Reformasi era, PAS joined Barisan Alternatif alongside parties that shared one platform: opposition to the ruling government.
However, concerns among non-Muslim voters regarding PAS’s commitment to an Islamic state became a major source of friction.
That experience was repeated in Pakatan Rakyat. PAS, DAP and PKR successfully challenged the dominance of Barisan Nasional and made significant electoral gains.
Yet disagreements over hudud legislation, Islamic governance, and constitutional questions eventually contributed to the coalition’s collapse.
In each case, short-term strategic goals united the coalition, while long-term ideological differences gradually pulled it apart.
PAS is without doubt a formidable political force. It is now the single largest party in the Dewan Rakyat. It has come to a point where PAS now thinks that Putrajaya is within its reach.
The party is not merely an electoral machine. It possesses a strong religious infrastructure, including clerical leadership, educational networks, and grassroots activists who view politics as part of a broader Islamic mission.
Consequently, PAS leaders must answer not only to voters but also to party members who expect ideological consistency.
Coalition compromises that may appear pragmatic to outside observers can be interpreted internally as abandoning fundamental principles. This creates pressure on party leaders to defend doctrinal positions even when political circumstances encourage moderation.
The leadership therefore operates within narrower negotiating boundaries than many coalition partners.
Conversely, PAS leaders and supporters often suspect that secular or multicultural partners seek to marginalise Islamic policies once electoral objectives have been achieved.
These mutual suspicions create fragile coalitions built more on shared opposition to a common rival than on a genuinely shared political vision.
When the common enemy weakens or political conditions change, the underlying differences become visible.
The Perikatan Nasional coalition differed from PAS’ previous alliances because its major partners draw support largely from the Malay-Muslim electorate.
This reduced some of the ideological tensions that plagued earlier coalitions involving secular and multi-ethnic parties.
Nevertheless, the challenges remained. Competition for leadership within the Malay political space, differing strategic priorities, and future electoral calculations still generated strains.
PAS cannot say it has severed its relationship with Bersatu and still work with Bersatu. The likelihood is that PAS will just work with former Bersatu deputy president Datuk Seri Hamzah Zainuddin’s new party, a breakaway group from Bersatu.
PAS’s difficulty in remaining within electoral coalitions is not primarily the result of poor leadership or tactical mistakes.
Rather, it reflects a deeper structural challenge facing ideological parties operating in diverse democratic societies.
To achieve national influence, PAS needs coalition partners. Yet the very principles that give PAS its identity and electoral loyalty create tensions with those same partners.
This tension has shaped the party’s history across multiple alliances and explains why coalition breakdowns have become a recurring feature of Malaysian politics.
As long as PAS remains committed to both ideological consistency and national political relevance, it will continue to face the difficult balancing act that has tested every coalition it has joined.
It will be disastrous for Malaysia if a religious and Malay-based party forms the federal government without genuine non-Muslim participation from the peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak.
